

### A. Introduction

Because the battle tactics of the various wars seem of minor importance compared to other political maneuvers, concentration of political interest will remain primarily with the leaders of the military, namely political heads of state, rather than with the generals, admirals, and other military personnel who serve the politicians.<sup>i</sup> The course goal for this topic is **to motivate students to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of democracy.**

### B. Long Range Causes

#### 1. Sovereignty persisted as an idea.

#### 2. Resentment

Intensity of air travel brought peoples closer together which gave peoples the world round more incentive to cooperate, but which ended in greater resentment. Germany was resentful because only she had to disarm. Her colonies were taken away from her after the First World War and given to lush France and England. To cause less resentment, the peacemakers would have done better to give the former German colonies to less well-off Italy.

#### 3. Frustration

Nationalistic economic growth prevented the necessary cooperation. All the economists, right and left wing, agreed more freedom was necessary. Instead, there were higher tariffs. Things became worse. United States interests needed foreign markets and the subsequent lack of markets brought depression. U. S. politicians were too provincial to cater to the national interest of the country.

#### 4. The Great Depression

The Great Depression was the most significant underlying cause of the Second World War. Italy, Japan, and Germany became more aggressive. Hitler could not have advanced without economic national crises from 1929 to 1933. With insecurity and crises it was too difficult to think in terms of mutual understanding.

#### 5. Crises

A series of crises came from the overt expression of totalitarianism. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria and no one challenged her. In 1934, Germany made a positive effort to take Austria. From 1935 on, Italy began to move in on Ethiopia, a member of the League of Nations. The League did not protect her.<sup>ii</sup> The 1936-39 Spanish Civil War was a curtain raiser for the Second World War. Franco with the Muslims and other mercenaries rebelled with support from Italy and Germany. Britain and France stayed out and by default, Russian Communists moved in and divided the loyalist government. Even a British ship was sunk, but Britain did not enter the war. When the Communists withdrew in 1939, Franco simply consolidated this position. The Spanish Civil War was taken as a sure sign that France and England would not enter the Second World War.<sup>iii</sup>

#### 6. Blindness

-240The English did not understand what Nazi, Fascist, and Japanese militarism stood for, refusing to believe what Mussolini and Hitler believed.

#### 7. Bad Friendships

The Nazis were close with the Bolsheviks.<sup>iv</sup> They kept diplomatic relationships even though they talked rough. Russia had worked with Japan since 1905 and Russia supported Italy in Ethiopia.

### C. The "Hot" War

The Second World War lasted from 1939 until 1945. After the German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, following the Munich Pact of 1938, the Western Powers began to rearm. When Hitler entered Poland, the allies declared war. In 1940 and 1941, England fought on practically alone after Hitler had overrun almost all of Europe. The Russian armies held on and finally began to win following Stalingrad in

1943. Invasions of Sicily in 1943 and Normandy in 1944 brought about the final collapse of Germany on May 7, 1945 with unconditional surrender.<sup>v</sup>

After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, public opinion in the U. S. consolidated behind the war effort. Japan ran unchecked until the Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942, after which it was a matter of time until the Japanese surrendered. In August 1945, the U. S. dropped her first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 14, 1945, Japan surrendered.

There was a savagery in the war on the Pacific, which was not present in the war on the Atlantic. Racism was the volatile difference. Racism contributed to the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was easier to bomb the Japanese than the Germans.

While U. S. racism was based on color, Japanese racism was based on hierarchy. Racial purity permitted the Yamato race to predominate and commit wartime atrocities. In Japan, homogeneity, common purpose, corporate unity and corporate will meant sophistication. In the U. S. that meant primitiveness and uncivilized status.<sup>vi</sup>

In the U. S. individualism, creative entrepreneurship, and maximum individual liberty meant sophistication. In Japan that meant racial heterogeneity and inability to mobilize toward anything morally worthwhile. How then did the two finally manage to get along after the war?

The wartime yellow ape became a post-war pet. Japanese wartime insanity was to be cured with post-war tender care. Post-war Japan could be shown how to mature. Americans liked that. The Japanese, led by their emperor, were willing to do that and so find their place in the world hierarchy.

#### D. Conclusion

By examining the Introduction, Long Range Causes, and The War, the student is better able to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. For further development, the student is reminded to read, study, and think.

### Supplement

#### E. The "Hot" War (continued)

Recently, students have become very concerned about how Japanese-American citizens were treated during the Second World War. My sense of the matter is that these U. S. citizens were treated unjustly, but that nothing like genocide was ever involved. My sense of the matter is that the Eastern Establishment acted overly defensively, notwithstanding mitigating circumstances, and, hence, let this dastardly deed happen. The President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and his chief advisors were from the East Coast. Even more recently, scholars have begun to develop how Japanese-Americans have assimilated themselves into United States culture.<sup>vii</sup>

Thirty million people died in World War II.<sup>viii</sup>

#### F. Introduction

In the spring of 1990, the professor realized that the lectures had nothing on Picasso (indexed in the fifth edition of Chambers on pages 1056, 1196, and 1316)<sup>ix</sup>, Cubism, dada, surrealism (indexed in the fifth edition of Chambers on page 1145)<sup>x</sup>, or constructivism. This supplement includes an attempt to offer at least something on art. The part on the Cold War was removed to this section in order to hold down the length of the original lecture. The paragraph on perestroika was in place on March 20, 1989, before the great opening of Eastern Europe during the winter of 1990. The comments on Guadalcanal are designed to add a little detail to what is found in the commercial textbook.

#### G. The Cold War

The cold war refers to the military maneuvering between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., which began during the Second World War and continued until October 1991 when the Soviet Union fell. (See the sixth edition of Chambers, page 1042.). The posturing began with self-righteousness under Harry S<sup>xi</sup> Truman. This was the time of the Marshall Plan and N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact.

The Marshall Plan exhibited a classic encounter between U. S. rationalism and European emotion. The Marshall plan was not an event so much "essentially cut off from the nation's previous history" but was a projection of U. S. "corporatism." U. S. rationalism was business minded. European emotion was politically minded.<sup>xiii</sup>

George F. Kennan, who served as director of the Policy Planning Staff in the United States State Department from 1948 to 1950, saw the situation more clearly than anyone else did. Kennan eventually quit because of the relentlessly anti-Communist and militarized character of United States foreign policy. On the one hand Kennan did not think that the Soviets were flexible enough to work out negotiated settlements. On the other hand neither did Kennan think that the Soviets needed to be violently forced into cooperation? Kennan regarded the dead weight of the Soviet system as sufficient to bring down the Soviet Union, as turned out to be the case.<sup>xiii</sup>

Under Eisenhower (1952-1960), the admission of U-2 spying took the moral edge off of the moral posture of the U. S. Eisenhower put an elite group of scientists, engineers, and defense bureaucrats in charge.<sup>xiv</sup> The War in Vietnam further delimited that posture of moral superiority.<sup>xv</sup> The present situation concerns arms reduction, particularly with the apparently easy victory of Desert Storm.

The significance of perestroika and glasnost is delivered by translating the words. Perestroika carries the sense of restructuring and revolution and new thinking.<sup>xvi</sup> Glasnost means openness, in the sense of clear, like a glass. The substantive significance of perestroika and glasnost can only be surmised from the media, in March 1990. By March 1993 the significance was that the Soviet Union had collapsed.

#### H. Jazz<sup>xvii</sup>

Music does tell the stories of cultures. Historians have used music to outline differences between United States and German culture. Russian culture may come later.

German jazz really was rebellion against the Nazi straight jacket. German jazz was simply American jazz as played by Germans. American jazz has its roots in the African American community and as such was particularly upsetting to Nazi Germany. Because Nazi Germany wanted trade, however, recordings of Jewish and Black artists, such as Benny Goodman, Duke Ellington, Benny Carter, and Fats Waller were permitted. In 1943, at the time of the Stalingrad disaster, Himmler sent some members of "Swing Youth" to concentration camps. "Swing Youth" had been formed in 1934. Benny Goodman was the leader of swing music.

#### I. Cubism

Some critics saw in cubism an attempt to remove art from its social and cultural moorings. Quite to the contrary, the professor sees modern art as a temper tantrum with human limitations. Picasso was in the cubist genre.

Surrealism challenged cubism with eroticism, inward vision, impotence, metamorphosis and liberation. The cubists seem to have responded, within the last twenty years, with a loss of interest in "line, color, and form" and a "reconsideration of iconology, allusion, and other levels of content."<sup>xviii</sup>

The relationship between politics and art has been considered in the regionalism of the 1930s as exemplified by Thomas Hart Benton and in the Abstract Expressionism of the 1940s as exemplified by Benton's student, Jackson Pollock. Benton was a liberal supporter of the New Deal. For Benton, American popular culture amounted to reformist politics. Pollock was a strong anti-Communist. There is a continuity and political context for the art of the depression and war decades.<sup>xix</sup>

## J. Guadalcanal

August 7, 1942 began the first major United States Pacific offense. The six-month long campaign for Guadalcanal began as an amphibious landing of United States Marines in the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands are between Pago Pago in American Samoa and New Guinea, and much closer to New Guinea. The Philippine Islands are between Guadalcanal and Vietnam, bordering the South China Sea. The battle of Guadalcanal, rather than the battle of Midway, marked the turning point of the war in favor of the United States.<sup>xx</sup>

The United States Navy fought seven sea battles round Guadalcanal, including the battle of Savo Island, "the most humiliating defeat in the history of the United States Navy."<sup>xxi</sup> This battle wakened the United States from a false sense of security resulting from superior technical and mental strength. Though Guadalcanal is shown clearly on Map 29.2 World War II in the Pacific on page 1223, the fifth edition of Chambers does not index Guadalcanal. Pago Pago would be off the map, to the right of the "Extent of Japanese Domination" in the key.

The Bikini Atoll is part of the Marshall Islands, roughly just to the north of the arrow leading from the Marshalls to Guam. "Radio Bikini" is an excellent documentary film depicting Operation Crossroads, when the United States Navy exploded the fourth and fifth atomic bombs. The first was in the United States Mohave Desert, the second over Hiroshima and the third over Nagasaki. The navy deployed 208 motion picture cameras at the site to record the destruction. These films are used to make "Radio Bikini." The film demonstrates how discourse was used to contain the nuclear threat following the Second World War. More importantly, the film shows how to critique the official version of events. The intricate arguments and data are still located in books, such as Paul Boyer's By the Bomb's Early Light (1985).<sup>xxii</sup>

How to control the new technology has been an everlasting problem. Dwight D. Eisenhower handed the problem

to an elite of scientists, engineers, and defense bureaucrats whose activities the vast majority of Americans could not understand and, not understanding, could not knowledgeably control. Eisenhower recognized the problem, and he spoke to it directly in his farewell address. While Eisenhower's warning against a "military-industrial complex" is often interpreted as the insight of a sage old general, it can also be read as an admission of defeat by a frustrated chief executive. Indeed, Eisenhower said he felt "a definite sense of disappointment," As well he might have, for more than any administration before or after, Eisenhower's promoted the growth of the military-industrial complex he decried.<sup>xxiii</sup>

Policy problems reverberate from the conflict between truth and politics. There is little substitute for the carefully chosen words of H. W. Brands:

Eisenhower's New Look (massive retaliation) policy was counterproductive in other ways, as well. Militarily, its reliance on advanced weaponry accelerated an arms race that rendered the United States more, not less, threatened. Politically, its overblown rhetoric fostered an atmosphere in which reasoned consideration of defense issues became nearly impossible, as the aftermath of Sputnik demonstrated. Strategically, by failing to deal adequately with the challenge of peripheral and limited war that increasingly characterized international struggles, massive retaliation forced the development of a second track of American security policy. Bureaucracies being what they are, the new policy--"flexible response"--did not replace the old; it simply supplemented it. The country wound up with the worst of both worlds: the high risks of strategic warfare and the high costs of limited conflict. Eisenhower entered office determined to contain defense spending and reduce American vulnerability. For a time, he contained defense spending. But the inadequacy of his leadership, combined with the intractable problems he faced, rendered nearly inevitable major increases in weapons budgets and an America left more vulnerable than ever.<sup>xxiv</sup>

The only problem with the carefully reasoned 1989 argument of Brands is that President Reagan followed the same policy with Star Wars and this policy eventually wore out the Soviet Union in the winter of 1990, as Reagan had predicted. While historians do get the last words on public policies, their consumers need to be sensitive to the tugs and pulls of political correctness determining what gets presented. By hindsight, in 1994, Dr. Jirran does not think that delivering "enormous power over fundamental policy decisions to an elite of scientists, engineers, and defense bureaucrats whose activities the vast majority of Americans could not understand and, not understanding, could not knowledgeably control" was all that bad of an idea.

Particularly at Thomas Nelson Community College there is concern about the local impact of global technology. Thomas Nelson Community College is the robotics center for the Tidewater area. A consideration of robotics offers an increased ability to evaluate what happened with World War II.

In 1983, Westinghouse Electric Corporation purchased the inventor of industrial robots, Unimation Incorporated. Shortly General Electric Company and International Business Machines Corporation and others joined the competition. By 1990 all United States companies had given up to the Japanese, who were licensing the technology.<sup>xxv</sup>

In 1967 inventor Joseph Engelberger used his robot to open a can of Budweiser and lead the band. America laughed while Japan invited Engelberger to address seven hundred industrialists and answer their questions for six hours. In 1968 Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. of Japan licensed the technology of Unimation. The difference was that Kawasaki also developed an all-electric version, which eventually came to replace the partially hydraulic version of Unimation.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Hydraulic machines sold for \$48,000; all electric for \$70,000. The difference was that all electric was worth the price because of increased efficiency. In 1984 the group developing the computer software which ran the robots quit because Westinghouse was no longer rewarding the entrepreneurs adequately. At issue was the approach. United States manufacturers thought of the robot as a commodity. To be effective, however, robots had to be treated as parts of a whole system. United States manufacturers developed complex robots, made to approach human capability. In such instances it is easier to hire humans than robots, because humans did not break down as much.<sup>xxvii</sup>

#### K. Conclusion

The incompatible inseparables at work here are those between violence and law, between bullets and ballots. Fortunately for human rights, the forces favoring ballots won the battle of bullets. By studying the Introduction, Long Range Causes, The "Hot" War, the first Conclusion, The "Hot" War (continued), the second Introduction, The Cold War, Jazz, Cubism, Guadalcanal and this second Conclusion, students have been motivated to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. The basic strength of democracy resides in ballots over bullets during peacetime and in bullets over bullets during wartime. Students are again reminded to read, study, think, and prepare a comment.

#### Footnotes

<sup>i</sup>Current History, available in the Thomas Nelson Community College library, is an excellent source for further reading in the following material.

<sup>ii</sup>There is a long since forgotten American Historical Review, article upon which this is based.

<sup>iii</sup>For a definitive study see Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45 as reviewed by Manfred Jonas, The American Historical Review, 89 (April 1984): 539-40.

<sup>iv</sup>See, for example, Richard Breitman, review of Conan Fischer, The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism, The American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (June 1992), page 880.

<sup>v</sup>The best account of the World War II campaigns from Normandy to the Elbe is Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945 as reviewed by Forrest C. Pogue in The American Historical Review, 87 (April 1982): 559-60.

<sup>vi</sup>George E. Moore, review of John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War in The Journal of American History, 73 (March 1987): 1074-1075.

<sup>vii</sup>Maxine Schwartz Seller, review of Stephen S. Fugita and David J. O'Brien, Japanese American Ethnicity: The Persistence of Community and The Japanese American Experience in The American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 5 (December 1992), pages 1612-1613.

<sup>viii</sup>Abraham D. Kriegel, review of Keith Eubank, The Origins of World War II, 2nd ed., Teaching History: A Journal of Methods, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pages 43-44.

<sup>ix</sup>Page 1083 and 1188 in the fourth edition of Chambers

<sup>x</sup>Page 1037 in the fourth edition of Chambers

<sup>xi</sup>Truman did not place a period after his middle initial.

<sup>xii</sup>Fraser Harbutt, review of Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 in The Journal of American History, 75 (September 1988): 672.

<sup>xiii</sup>David S. McLellan, review of Anders Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy, The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, No. 1 (June 1990), pages 352-353.

<sup>xiv</sup>H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," The American Historical Review, 94 (October 1989): 985.

<sup>xv</sup>Michael P. Riccards, review Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17 (Winter 1987), p. 166.

<sup>xvi</sup>John Quigley, "Notes and Comments: Perestroika and International Law," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 82, No. 4 (October 1988), p. 788 and Richard Szawlowski, review of Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World, p. 880.

<sup>xvii</sup>Michael H. Kater, "Forbidden Fruit: Jazz in the Third Reich," The American Historical Review, Vol. 94 No. 1 (February 1989): 20-39

<sup>xviii</sup>Christopher Green, Cubism and Its Enemies: Modern Movements and Reaction in French Art, 1916-1928 as cited in the review by Marion F. Deshmukh in The American Historical Review, 94 (April 1989), pages 462-463.

<sup>xix</sup>Marlene Park, review of Erika Doss, Benton, Pollock, and the Politics of Modernism: From Regionalism to Abstract Expressionism in The American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 5 (December 1992), page 1617.

<sup>xx</sup>Sam H. Frank, review of Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal, The Journal of American History, Vol. 78, No. 3 (December 1991), pages 1136-1137.

<sup>xxi</sup>Sam H. Frank, review of Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal, The Journal of American History, Vol. 78, No. 3 (December 1991), pages 1136.

<sup>xxii</sup>Clayton R. Koppes, review of "Radio Bikini," produced and directed by Robert Stone, The American Historical Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (October 1989), page 1050-1051.

<sup>xxiii</sup>H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability ??," The American Historical Review, Vol. 94, No. 3 (October 1989), pages 988-989.

<sup>xxiv</sup>H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability ??," The American Historical Review, Vol. 94, No. 3 (October 1989), pages 988-989.

<sup>xxv</sup>Amal Kumar Naj, "Product Failure: How U.S. Robots Lost The Market to Japan In Factory Automation: Westinghouse Put Hydraulics Ahead of Electric Units, Which Japanese Stressed, The Need for Custom Design," The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, November 6, 1990, page 1 ff.

<sup>xxvi</sup>Amal Kumar Naj, "Product Failure: How U.S. Robots Lost The Market to Japan In Factory Automation: Westinghouse Put Hydraulics Ahead of Electric Units, Which Japanese Stressed, The Need for Custom Design," The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, November 6, 1990, page 1 and 12.

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