

# HIS 102-09 The Enlightenment© July 22, 2001

Raymond J. Jirran

## A. *Introduction*

Intellectual life does not exist in isolated compartments. While students can look at the scientific advances outside the context of political environment, students seldom do this in practice. The practice here will be not much different, with the course goal **to evaluate the legitimation of human rights within the context of chronology, personality, place, and degree of certitude warranted**. The emphasis is on reason, natural law, and progress. The focus will be on the seminal thinker of the Enlightenment, John Locke.

## B. *Locke*

1. John Locke, the intellectual source of many human rights, owned slaves. In 1674, Lock bought 440 pounds sterling of stock in the Royal African Company, the company whose new charter of 1672 monopolized the English slave trade.<sup>1</sup> While Locke wrote that the oppressed had a right to revolt, he did not think African slaves should do it. Locke wrote: "Whenever he finds the hardship of slavery out-weighs the value of his Life, 'tis in his Power, by resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on him the Death he desires."<sup>2</sup> Locke did not think Black slaves had a right to rebel. When Locke wrote that while men might not be "naturally equal, I am sure all slaves are,"<sup>3</sup> he was being sarcastic. A sense of sarcasm about Western liberty can be found in the Black perspective of that liberty.

### 2, Two Treatises of Civil Government

Before developing Locke, a comment on the meaning of the term liberal: liberal means willingness to change, in such a way that it is possible for the liberal of today to be the conservative of tomorrow, once change has taken place.<sup>4</sup> The meaning of a liberal education, for example, is to understand how to put away the old and take on the new, in time to cope with the changing environment.

John Locke (fl. 1688) figuratively put a pistol at the heads of Western civilization to convince it to change. Locke did this on the basis of his distinction between state and society.<sup>5</sup> Actually, Voltaire might be considered "Mr. Enlightenment" because Voltaire dominated the intellectual life of the Western world on the basis of Locke. Do think of Locke, nevertheless, as "Mr. Enlightenment." In a sense, then, Locke gave Voltaire the pistol. Voltaire died about a decade before the French Revolution.

Voltaire was convinced that Locke had done for the human mind what Newton had done for the physical universe, namely, formulate the natural law by which it is bound. In the Two Treatises of Civil Government by Locke, liberalism found a clear expression. The treatises and the English Revolution of 1688 reinforced each other in the historical context, Locke giving a rationale for the Revolution, the Revolution giving meaning to the theories of Locke.

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## 3. Nature

In some ways, the Seventeenth Century conception of a "state of nature" was simply a secularization of the Garden of Paradise. Locke put a pistol in the Garden of Paradise. Where the Garden of Paradise sought to depict man as God originally created him, the state of nature sought to examine him apart from his divine origin. Various views prevailed. For Thomas Hobbes (b. 1588), the state of nature was characterized as a "war of all against all." Hobbes and Locke are two of the three recognized founding fathers of liberalism. John Stuart Mill (ca. 1871) is the third.

Hobbes advocated the notion "that philosophers should have masters who enforced peace among them and laid down the principles of their activity."<sup>6</sup> Hobbes opposed Robert Boyle and the Royal Society which advocated "free men, freely acting, faithfully delivering what they witnessed and sincerely believed to be the case."<sup>7</sup> The immediate argument between Hobbes and Boyle was the argument about whether or not the vacuum pump, which Boyle built, actually worked. Some scholars posit that the issue derived from that argument about the vacuum pump revolved about the greater idea that "solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order."<sup>8</sup>

The hidden issue rested between truth and politics. Hobbes maintained that church government was properly a subset of, rather than co-equal to, state government. Hobbes simply described how Seventeenth Century politics was working. Hobbes was not particularly attacking the church.<sup>9</sup>

The Royal Society insisted that "free discourse did not breed dispute, scandal, or civil war" and that such a free state transpired into "an idealized reflection of the (Cromwellian) Revolution settlement."<sup>10</sup> In the struggle to understand the human condition, current scholars resolve that "Knowledge, as much as the state, is the product of human actions. Hobbes was right."<sup>11</sup>

Liberals reject the Royal Society of this time as composed largely of frivolous English country gentlemen posing as scientists.<sup>12</sup> Frivolous or not, the Royal Society did not have frivolous consequences. As time went on, Newton would be encouraged to continue in his work by that same Royal Society of London.<sup>13</sup> Hobbes served in the more philosophical train of thought suitable to the development of liberalism.<sup>14</sup>

### **C. Conclusion**

In this lesson, students have evaluated the legitimation of human rights within the context of chronology, personality, place, and degree of certitude warranted. There has been a special emphasis on John Locke. Students have examined the Introduction and three of the four parts to Locke. Students are reminded to read and think and study, all the while keeping the course goal in mind, namely to evaluate the legitimation of human rights within the context of chronology, personality, place, and degree of certitude warranted.

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## Supplement

### **D. Introduction**

Sections E and F of this Supplement result from reformatting the lecture to fit less space. The thoughts on G. Religion are not enough in the mainstream of historical thinking to merit the lecture proper.

### **E. Locke (continued)**

#### 2. Nature (continued)

For Rousseau (ca. 1776), who culminated the Enlightenment, the state of nature, far from being a fearful existence, was bliss. Rousseau exhibited sexism. His attitude was that a man works, works, and develops his brain and when he meets a woman, it all goes down the drain. Nature was a state not only of freedom, but also of equality in which "all power and jurisdiction" was reciprocal.

Montesquieu, about twenty years older than Rousseau, had the better ideas. Montesquieu influenced J. P. Marat, Robespierre, Mirabeau, and Benjamin Constant. Montesquieu postulated that people were able to shape their environment far more through institutions and circumstances than by virtue and will, as Rousseau came to think. Montesquieu had rejected antiquity in favor of the modern world. Rousseau remained wedded to a literal re-creation of Sparta. Rousseauianism tended to breed a cynical amoralism that remains in the culture.<sup>15</sup>

### **F. Revolution**

When the government failed to preserve their rights, the people not only had the right but the responsibility to revolt and to start a new government. This responsibility is the pistol mentioned above. No doctrine of Locke had more influence than this doctrine of revolution, embodied in the Declaration of Independence. The theory of Locke gave a means of enforcing the contractual basis of government.

For Locke the state of nature was like the song "Born Free." What, then, about the pistol? Locke explained that men entered society because of several weaknesses which characterized the state of nature: (a) the need to discover: an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong. For though the law of nature was plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, men were frequently biased by self-interest as well as ignorance from want of study to their particular case; (b) the need to apply the law by a definite and impartial judge "with authority to determine all differences according to the established law;" (c) the need to enforce a decision since there is not "power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution." Ah, there is the pistol.

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In the 1640s, the English House of Commons invented a sovereign people to overcome a sovereign king.<sup>16</sup> The notion of a sovereign people leads to, but is not the same as popular sovereignty. The idea of popular sovereignty developed long after Locke. Locke wrote in 1688. The first great war for empire began in 1688.<sup>17</sup> This was the war between France and the League of Augsburg. This war freed England to engage in the French and Indian Wars between 1756 and 1763 in America.<sup>18</sup> The French and Indian War is indexed in the seventh edition of Chambers on pages 650-652, though the League of Augsburg is not.<sup>19</sup>

If English theorists lauded revolution, French theorists did not. Louis XIV died in 1715. After Louis died there was considerable discussion about fundamental law. Fundamental law was fundamental either because (1) it was willed by the king; or (2) it arose from "a primitive and original contract," or (3) common usage. Fundamental laws are mentioned in the box, "Spanish Liberals Draft a Constitution, 1812" on page 749 in the seventh edition of Chambers.

German thinkers began asserting a priority of ancient German customary law over imperial Roman law. These German thinkers were getting closer to the notion of popular sovereignty.<sup>20</sup> The 1776 United States Declaration of Independence was Lockean because the Declaration emphasized natural rights and consent. The people properly controlled the government externally, from without.<sup>21</sup>

In 1787, Madison invented a sovereign people to overcome the sovereign states. The United States Constitution is Montesquieuan because the Constitution emphasized the internal balance of government. Montesquieu had a moderating effect on the pistol in the Garden.<sup>22</sup> By this time the fiction of popular sovereignty had been definitely accepted. Popular sovereignty is a fiction because governments cannot be coequal with the people who are governed.<sup>23</sup>

Montesquieu separated from the Enlightenment over the issue of the proper function of reason in government. For Montesquieu, reason divided the people, while emotion brought the people together. The Founders of the United States agreed. That is why United States democracy is representative, rather than direct. The principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial combines with the principle of checks and balances to result in moderate government with place for reason and emotion, both.<sup>24</sup>

No one juxtaposes truth and politics like the professor. College education only reached the masses following World War II and that in the United States. Before World War II, only the middle and upper classes received higher education. Higher education was a means of perpetuating rather than changing the status quo. From a minority perspective, such as Black, using higher education to change rather than perpetuate the status quo becomes imperative. Other scholars will have to unpack exactly what happened.

When Rousseau (1712-1778) came along, he did not deny that there were constitutional or fundamental laws. The people as sovereign were superior to the state and, in that sense, were not bound by the social contract, described in the seventh edition of Chambers on page 669.<sup>25</sup>

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That idea of Rousseau provoked the rulers of Europe. Other ideas of Rousseau, such as the one utilized in the lecture proper, provoke women.

Rousseau never really thought through his ideas about women. He never considered the relationship between men and women either as an argument in favor of heterosexuality and mutual interdependence or as an argument in favor of homosexuality and mutual freedom, the one from the other. It is not that Rousseau did not write a lot about the relationship between men and women. It is just that Rousseau never followed his thought to where contemporary thinkers want to go.

So, where to go? Current feminist scholarship "remains unsettled in its theoretical basis and [is] thus open to contributions from all quarters."<sup>26</sup> The point has shifted from what Rousseau thought about women to the struggles of contemporary scholars to formulate their own views.

Getting back more properly to history, an early feminist writer, Mary Astell, used the doctrine of consent to argue against male dominance in society and the family: "If arbitrary power is evil in itself, and an improper Method of Governing Rational and Free Agents, it ought not to be Practis'd any where."<sup>27</sup>

During the Enlightenment, there seems to have been another major change in the making. Witch hunting ended not so much because of the "rise of modern scientific thinking, rationalism, and Enlightenment," as because of the "political dethronement of God" following the Reformation. This meant the sanctification of the state and the desanctification of the church. Witches were enemies of God, not of the state.<sup>28</sup>

## **G. Religion**

Academia subscribes to the Enlightenment tradition, a tradition with its emphasis on reason, which is fundamentally ahistorical, irreligious, and prone to Marxism.<sup>29</sup> Just because any judgment about an historical event is, itself, an historical event does not make reality absolutely relative, absolutely irreligious, absolutely ahistorical. Neither is it correct to divorce judgments concerning faith completely from their historicity. The legitimate function of the Enlightenment is to bring reason to bear, just as coldly and as clearly as possible, on all aspects of reality.

What happened during the Seventeenth Century was that a secular theology arose, that is, a theology by laymen for laymen. This idea that scientific study glorifies the Creator and, thus could safely be joined with theology, only lasted about a century, from roughly Galileo to Newton. Secular theology came out of both nominalism and humanism, i.e., out of the religious and secular aspects of the Renaissance. Thanks largely to Descartes (1596-1650) the world came to be seen as a sort of God's machine. The problem with such an approach is that the creator of a machine no longer need exist, after the machine is once made.<sup>30</sup>

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This idea that an impersonal God created the universe is known as deism. Contrary to what is usually thought, such an idea did not flourish in France until after the Seventeenth Century. It was only in the Eighteenth Century that deism caught on.<sup>31</sup>

Descartes, like Plato, started with innate ideas, rather than with sensual experiences. These ideas reached their extreme with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who emphasized that mathematical truths, such as  $2 + 2 = 4$ , were more reliable than sensual truths, such as the sun rises and sets. Actually, the sun neither rises nor sets, but the earth revolves. Reliance on measurement eventually became known as positivism, a sterile philosophy which denied reliability to that which could not be measured.<sup>32</sup> This change from the qualitatively rich to the qualitatively sterile philosophies occurred around 1600 with Galileo.

A religious ferment erupted among the Dutch, which between 1620 and 1690 resulted in the promotion of rationalism as a means of interpreting the Bible. The next step was Spinozist secular rationalism.<sup>33</sup>

Chambers indexes Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) in the first three editions but not thereafter. Spinoza is the Hebrew Dutch philosopher who answered Descartes (1596-1650) with a theory of deism. Some of the followers of Spinoza in Holland turned his work into an anti-Christian view. By the time Voltaire got finished using deism, the church was on the defensive. Then came Darwin and Freud, who will have to wait until Topics Twenty-Four, Darwin and Twenty-Five, Freud.<sup>34</sup>

But what about Locke? Locke was a liberal Christian, as distinct from a Calvinist caught up in the ravages of original sin. Locke believed that kings have no authority over matters of faith. Because Locke was not a deist, he is not a full fledged member of the Enlightenment. But because both Locke and Dr. Jirran are Christians, the near compatibility of Christianity with the Enlightenment looms important. Academe has largely accepted the attitudes of the Enlightenment.<sup>35</sup>

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) resolutely opposed the democratic underpinnings of the Enlightenment. Heidegger favored emotion over reason, distinct people over human nature in general.<sup>36</sup> Heidegger grouped people on the basis of language, rather than genetics. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe "states that Heidegger represents a kind of romanticism."<sup>37</sup> Jacques Derrida, among other well-known thinkers, regards him as the greatest thinker of the Twentieth Century.<sup>38</sup> Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut present Heidegger in the antithesis, or opposite, of a position Dr. Jirran finds attractive, namely modernism.

Modernism aims at constructing a doctrine of freedom where freedom is seen as requiring the absence of any discernible code, whether natural or traditional. Freedom requires that an individual be understood as a self-defining nothing. Premoderns believed in a predefined natural code. Hence, they had no doctrine of freedom.<sup>39</sup>

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Because Heidegger rejected such modernism, Heidegger fell into the intellectual trap of National Socialism, out of which came Nazism. Nazism is intellectually unproductive. But Heidegger also offered some productive, worthwhile insights.

Heidegger based his anti-modernity on the fear of technological domination. Heidegger is not to be regarded as a neoconservative fascist philosopher "determined to impose tradition upon people by force."<sup>40</sup> Heidegger was originally a Catholic. Dr. Jirran regards that Catholic base as responsible for the valid insights Heidegger does offer.

Heidegger philosophized about German nationalism, which subsequently improperly impaled his philosophical reputation for seeking the truth on the racial and anti-Semitic political doctrines of Nazism. Heidegger's philosophy had merit, though his politics did not. Heidegger was a Nazi, at least for a while. Heidegger refused to denounce the concentration camps and in one infamous comment "equated the extermination of the Jews with mechanized modern agriculture and the forced deportation of Germans from Silesia."<sup>41</sup>

Scholars have unfairly used Heidegger's politics, his failure to oppose Nazism, to impugn his philosophy. In the tradition of Aristotle, Marx, and John Dewey, Heidegger sought the philosophical link between praxis and theory, between doing and thinking, between manual and intellectual work.<sup>42</sup>

Scholars can link racial ideology with modernism. Peggy Pascoe developed this thesis in her "Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of 'Race' in Twentieth-Century America," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 83, No. 1 (June 1996). The announcement that her essay won the 1996 Berkshire Conference Article Prize appears in *The Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Winter 1998).<sup>43</sup>

Pascoe defines modernist racial ideology as "the single, powerfully persuasive belief that the eradication of racism depends on the deliberate nonrecognition of race."<sup>44</sup> Pascoe concludes, "modernist racial ideology supports an Alice-in-Wonderland interpretation of racism in which even those who argue for racially oppressive policies can adamantly deny being racists."<sup>45</sup>

The professor maintains that United States citizens worship God by making equitable opportunities available for people who, otherwise, would not have equitable opportunities. The issue is not equal opportunity, but equitable opportunity. As a denial of equitable opportunity, United States racism contradicts basic national values. Recognizing racism requires some sort of recognition of race. That is the point Pascoe makes legitimately.

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## **H. Voltaire**

Is Voltaire properly regarded as a historian? Dr. Jirran thinks not, though many others, including Chambers, do. Voltaire demonstrated ". . . a very real understanding of historical method, subject matter, and research techniques . . ." <sup>46</sup> Compared to what went before, this was an improvement. Compared to what was yet to come, Voltaire hardly merits the accolade of "historian." Voltaire and the Encyclopedists with him stop "far short `of what we usually consider our still more enlightened appreciation for diverse civilizations." <sup>47</sup>

Voltaire is important in his own right for inventing the notion of Eastern Europe, as something distinct from Western Europe. Where the Renaissance divided Europe between North and South, the Enlightenment divided Europe between East and West. Voltaire himself got no farther east than Berlin. In correspondence with Catherine the Great of Russia, Voltaire delineated the east as that territory between the Baltic Sea and the lower Danube River. <sup>48</sup> The professor traces the line roughly from the Baltic to the Adriatic Seas.

Other thinkers stayed with the East-West dichotomy. When Montesquieu visited Hungary in 1728, he thought it would be only a matter of time before Hungary traced the steps already taken in the West. Rousseau, because he was less contemptuous of the East, stood apart from other Enlightenment thinkers. Like the other Enlightenment thinkers, however, Rousseau shared a condescending attitude toward the East. Eastern Europe served as a buffer against Asia. This attitude remains into current scholarship. East Europeans themselves have yet to contribute to the discussion. <sup>49</sup>

## **I. Incompatible Inseparables**

Students have asked Dr. Jirran to develop themes through the course. One of those themes involves the incompatible inseparables, which are described in Topic 16 of the First Semester of Western civilization, "The Making of Western Europe." For the purpose of reminding former students and introducing the material to new students the pertinent section of that lecture is quoted from the May 30, 1992 edition:

The Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian inheritance provided the fundamental frame for the elaboration of high medieval and older European civilization. Inseparable incompatibilities permeated this inheritance as Europeans confronted unresolvable tension (1) between the supremacy of the territorial state as the "natural" unit of human society and the claim of the church to govern human souls. There were also tensions (2) between faith and reason, value and fact, morality and science, each claiming to be the path to truth, and (3) between naturalism and symbolism or empiricism and aesthetics and (4) between violence and law, and (5) between the vernacular, or language as spoken by the people, and Latin, or language as spoken by the intellectual specialist. These inseparable contrarities were built into the very foundation of European society and have been neither escaped nor permanently resolved by anyone accepting Western civilization. Identifying truth with God and God with truth has legitimated the insights resulting from trying to resolve the

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inseparable contrarities. These insights, in turn, have given the West her predominance in the current scheme.

It was only with the May 30, 1992 revision that Dr. Jirran was able to telescope the incompatible inseparables into the value-laded thesis that Western civilization is designed to let truth determine politics, rather than politics, truth. The West has gained preeminence by deliberately placing truth before politics. To the knowledge of Dr. Jirran, no other civilization either recognizes the dichotomy or resolves the dichotomy in favor of truth.

Quite possibly, Western civilization incorporated into its structure a wider variety of incompatible elements than did any other civilization of the world. The prolonged and restless growth of the West, repeatedly rejecting its own potentially "classical" formulations, may have been related to the contrarities built so deeply into its structure. Coming late to the scene and inheriting such incompatibles, the high civilization of the Far West has not yet come to rest but has renewed itself many times over. No other civilized society can make such a claim that it has exerted such drastic influence all around the world as has the West. In this incorporation of such a variety of incompatible elements, far more than in any particular intellectual, institutional, or technological expression, lies the real uniqueness of Western civilization.

## **J. Conclusion**

This lecture underwent a major revision during the 1992 Fall Semester. Dr. Jirran is confident that student scrutiny will expose a need for further improvements. In the meantime the gist of the lecture is about the relationship between how Dr. Jirran regards himself and academe. Both seek the truth independent of political ramifications. The difficulty with the lecture rests in presenting the variety of facets involved with both truth and politics.

At a less deep level, the underlying idea is that both truth and human rights are legitimated in the same intellectual vein. The incompatible inseparable at work is primarily the tension between faith and reason, value and fact, morality and science, each claiming to be the path to truth. The section on Locke works to integrate the meaning of freedom into the faith-reason relationship. In the Supplement, Locke, Revolution, Religion, Voltaire, and the Incompatible Inseparables themselves are all about this relationship.

Comments on the Seventh Edition of Chambers, pages 656-687

In the opinion of the professor, Chambers is the most scholarly textbook on the market. Chambers well represents mainstream thinking in the history profession. The professor, however, disagrees in many significant ways with mainstream thinking. Some of these disagreements are set forth above and others in the following comments.

Page Column

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		Paragraph	Line	
0657	1	1	7-8	"Displacing the authority of religion with that of reason ..."
				Displacing the authority of the church with the authority of the state or displacing the authority of faith with that of reason are better parallel constructions. The professor prefers the church and state parallel.
0658	1	3	12	"...scientific method..."
				Note that Chambers is not claiming <i>the</i> scientific method. As time advances scholars are less inclined to regard the issue as methodological. The professor regards the issue as between truth determining politics or politics determining truth.
0660	2	3-4		"Voltaire became...one of the century's most brilliant ...historians ...Voltaire believed that religious superstition inevitably bred fanaticism..."
				The professor has little regard for historians who, after the fact, then regard history as <i>inevitable</i> . See page 0778, 2, 7-8; 0824 caption.
0663	2	1	3-4	"...the Western experience..."
				This may be the only place, besides page 1, where Chambers uses the phrase, "the Western experience." The significance of the usage here is coziness between the basic assumptions of Chambers and the Enlightenment.
0665	2	2	7	"At about..."
0682	1	2	14	"...at about..."
				The professor would prefer <i>about</i> .
0670	2	1	3-4	"...peasants and workers..."
				This is difficult. In the United States, slavery assumes Black slavery, although in Europe such is not the case. Were Chambers to incorporate the term slavery here, that term would easily be misunderstood. Not using the term implies a qualitative difference in the material aspects of life that was not always the case.
0678	2	1	13	"...civic virtue..."

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0679 caption

"...civic virtue..."

Civic virtue is the attempt by the academic community to substitute secular for religious virtue.

0681 1 3 7-9

"The Catholic Church, as well, believed that the spread of literacy would serve its cause in the battle against heresy.

In other words, truth should determine politics.

0685 2 12th item

"The reverberations of the Enlightenment in Spain--a case study not discussed in the present text."

As a Catholic, the professor wonders about this lack of discussion.

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<sup>1</sup> M. Cranston, *John Locke* (London, 1957), page 115. ?? Wednesday, April 26, 2000

<sup>2</sup> Locke, *Two Treatises*, II px 24, 3-6

<sup>3</sup> Locke, *TT*, p. 309 II, px lv, 11. 15-16, p. 213 I Px 51, 11. 20-21.

<sup>4</sup> The fifth edition of Chambers begins to treat liberalism on page 775. See his index for further references. The seventh edition begins on page 665.

<sup>5</sup> Paul A. Rahe, "The Primacy of Politics in Ancient Greece," [The American Historical Review](#), 89 (April 1984): 268.

<sup>6</sup> Cited in I. Bernard Cohen, review of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, [Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life](#), [The American Historical Review](#), 92 (June 1987): as page 339 on page 659.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, as page 339 on page 659.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, as page 332 on page 659.

<sup>9</sup> Wolfgang Reinhard, "Reformation, Counter-reformation, and the Early Modern State: A Reassessment," [The Catholic Historical Review](#), 75, No. 3 (July 1989), page 400.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, as page 341 on page 659. Topic 7 Prussia, B. General Setting, paragraph 1 mentions the "Cromwellian revolution from below". Oliver Cromwell is indexed in the fifth edition of Chambers on pages 593-594-5, in the sixth edition before the readings for this course begin.

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<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, as page 344, on page 659.

<sup>12</sup> See Chambers, 4th ed., p. 574.

<sup>13</sup> See Chambers, 4th ed., p. 631.

<sup>14</sup> I am uncomfortable placing Boyle and the Royal Society outside the realm of liberalism. Any student interested in checking this out, at three points per hour, should see me before beginning.

<sup>15</sup> R. Emmet Kennedy, Jr. review of Norman Hampson, Will and Circumstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Revolution, The American Historical Review, 91:???. See me about extra credit for locating the exact citation for this. I was unable to locate it either December 11, 1987, January 7, 1993, or with the following Dialog search January 9, 1993: "b38} or s emmet(w)Kennedy and Norman (w)Hampson."

<sup>16</sup> Colin Brooks, review of Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America in The American Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (June 1990), page 780.

<sup>17</sup> Robert C. Ritchie, review of Richard R. Johnson, John Nelson, Merchant Adventurer: A Life Between Empires, The Journal of American History, Vol. 78, No. 4 (March 1992), page 1419-1429.

<sup>18</sup> Judith S. Levey and Agnes Greenhall, editors, The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia, (New York: Avon Books, 1983), page 307.

<sup>19</sup> The League of Augsburg is touched upon in the fifth edition of Chambers on page 671 but is not indexed in the sixth or seventh editions.

<sup>20</sup> Martyn P. Thompson, "The History of Fundamental Law" (abbreviated title), The American Historical Review, 92 (December 1987): 1121.

<sup>21</sup> Judith A. Best, review of Ann M. Cohler, Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 1990), page 389.

<sup>22</sup> Judith A. Best, review of Ann M. Cohler, Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 1990), page 389.

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- <sup>23</sup> Colin Brooks, review of Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America in The American Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (June 1990), page 780.
- <sup>24</sup> Judith A. Best, review of Ann M. Cohler, Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 1990), page 3, Judith A. Best, review of Ann M. Cohler, Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 1990), page 390.
- <sup>25</sup> Described in the fifth edition of Chambers on page 765; in the sixth edition page 618 and 619b, in the seventh edition page 669.
- <sup>26</sup> Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, review of Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The American Historical Review, 90 (June 1985): 669.
- <sup>27</sup> See me about extra credit for locating the exact citation for this in The American Historical Review.
- <sup>28</sup> The idea that witch hunting was part of a sex war is controversial. Maurice Lee, Jr. review of Christina Lerner, Witchcraft and Religion: The Politics of Popular Belief, ed. by Alan MacFarlane, The American Historical Review, 91 (April 1986): 389-390.
- <sup>29</sup> Three points to the first person to show me where this is in The American Historical Review.
- <sup>30</sup> Norma E. Emerton, review of Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, The American Historical Review, 94 (February 1989): 122.
- <sup>31</sup> Richard H. Poplin, review of C. J. Betts, Early Deism in France: From the So-Called "deists" of Lyon (1564) to Voltaire's "Lettres philosophiques" (1734) in The American Historical Review, 92 (February 1989): 141-142.
- <sup>32</sup> A. Mark Smith, "Knowing Things Inside Out: The Scientific Revolution from a Medieval Perspective," The American Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (June 1990), page 743.
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- <sup>34</sup> For an excellent summary of the current relationship between religion and science, see the review by Otto T. Benfey of God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science, David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers (eds.) in Religion and Intellectual Life, 6 (Fall 1988): 130-131.
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<sup>44</sup> Peggy Pascoe, "Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of 'Race' in Twentieth-Century America," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 83, No. 1 (June 1996), page 48.

<sup>45</sup> Peggy Pascoe, "Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of 'Race' in Twentieth-Century America," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 83, No. 1 (June 1996), page 68.

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<sup>47</sup> Nelly S. Hoyt, review of Henry Vyverberg, Human Nature, Cultural Diversity, and the French Enlightenment, The American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 3 (June 1991), page 883. The quote within the quote is from Vyverberg, page 204.

<sup>48</sup> Keith Hitchins, review of Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 101, No. 1 (February 1996), page 207.

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